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His Lordship rejected the argument that the written agreement,
if valid, does not create a defence but only renders the plaintiff liable
to damages for not withholding action as agreed. Although the plaintiff's right of action on the six promissory notes has not been extinguished, to allow the argument "would be to countenance the
circuity of action and multiplicity of proceedings which it was one
of the chief objects of the Judicature Acts to abolish and would be
contrary to the terms of subsection 7 of section 2 of the Laws
Declaratory Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 213." 9 While this is extremely
persuasive language it is at least interesting that the practical effect
of the Court's decision is to specifically enforce a promise in a situation in which its counterpart could not be so enforced nor even sued
upon for more than nominal damages since the breach thereof would
result in a financial benefit to the plaintiff. The case of Stracy v.
0
upon which
The Governor and Company of the Bank of England,1
His Lordship relied, was substantially different in this respect.
While the result in Foot v. Rawlings will probably not leave many
with a sense of injustice, it is disappointing that the highest court in
the land did not seize the opportunity to illuminate some difficult
conceptual issues. F.E.A.

Mazur v. ImperialInvestment CorporationLimited, [1963] S.C.R. 281.
The issue with which the Supreme Court of Canada was faced
in this case had not been previously dealt with by a Canadian court.
The Court split three to two in affirming the decision of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta and the trial judge Riley
J. in finding for the plaintiff.
K wishing to raise money on a truck he owned, went to S, the
manager of a car sales agency. S made arrangements to have money
advanced by the plaintiff company to the defendant M, a friend of
K's, on a purported conditional sale. The transaction was as follows:
S was to transfer K's truck to M; M would sign a promissory note
and a conditional sale contract. The contract would be assigned
to the plaintiff company and the note discounted with the plaintiff
company by S. The proceeds thereof were to be paid by S to K and
K was to make all the periodic payments. In fact, K never transferred
the truck to S and the whole scheme was merely a device to raise
money. The net amout to be raised was discussed and understood to
be $10,000.
M. signed the conditional sale contract and the promissory
note in blank and transferred them to S who in turn negotiated them
to the plaintiff company for value. The plaintiff in fact filled in the
9Supra footnote 1 at p. 205.
10 (1830) 6 Bing. 754; 8 L.J. O.S.C.P. 234.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

blanks in the promissory note in the amount of $14,326.96 which
amount included $12,000 to S and finance and handling charges. S
fraudulently withheld the money paid, from K and M, and the plaintiff
now sues M on the promissory note, only three payments having been
made.
The majority opinion in the Supreme Court of Canada, written
by Judson J. and concurred in by Fauteux and Martland J.J. held
that it was not open for the court to draw inferences of a conditional
delivery and failure to fill in a document in accordance with authority
given in the circumstances of this case. The minority on the other
hand, Cartwright and Hall J.J. found that on the facts, M had signed
the note in blank subject to certain conditions which were not fulfilled
and that therefore the note became unenforceable within section 32
of the Bills of Exchange Act.
In the majority decision it was pointed out that M knew, three
weeks after signing the note, that it had been filled out in an amount
which would produce $12,000 and had raised no objection at that
time. The trial judge had found as a fact that the defendant M had
not given instructions to S as to what should be done with the note.
The majority concluded from these facts that the plaintiff fell within
section 31 of the Bills of Exchange Act and had prima facie authority
to fill the bill out in any amount he desired and as was pointed out
no inference of any condition attached by M on the filling out of the
note in order to bring the case within section 32 would be drawn.
Cartwright and Hall J.J. both dissented primarily because of the
fact that it was understood that the note was to be used in order to
raise an amount of $10,000 and not $12,000; hence, the note as it was
filled out was unenforceable within section 32. Cartwright J. suggested
other conditions attached to M's execution of the note which were not
complied with but did not seriously press this attack in his judgment.
It is clear that the result of the case turned on whether or not
the plaintiff company had filled out the defendant's note in accordance
with the authority given by the defendant and therefore whether
any limitations were attached by the defendant to his signature so
as to make it unenforceable within section 32.
Despite the finding of the trial judge, that no express instructions
were given by the defendant to S, the minority drew an inference
as to the limitations attached to the use of the note. The majority
would not do this.
The common law position on this area of law was that once a
person executed a negotiable instrument in blank he was estopped
from denying its validity when filled in. Section 32 of the Bill of
Exchange Act has displaced this rule now requiring that such a note
be filled in with authority given in order to be enforceable while conceding that a blank instrument may, prima facie, be filled in for any
amount under Section 31. The Supreme Court has held that on the
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present facts no limitations were put on this prima facie authority.
Interpreted broadly, the ratio of this case could be that any limitations
on authority which are to render a note unenforceable within Section
32 must be expressed. This view, I submit, is desirable as it would
add certainty to commercial transactions, an element much appreciated by the business community. In effect, by this view, a holder
of a blank note need fill it in only in accordance with express conditions
stated and need not worry that a court would draw inferences of
limited authority from surrounding circumstances. D.R.O'C.

K. PATENTS
BoehringerSohn v. Bell-CraigLtd., [1963] S.C.R. 410.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in C. H. Boehringer
Sohn v. Bell-Craig Limited, [1963] S.C.R. 410, 25 Fox Pat. C. 36 is
of considerable importance in determining the form of claims to be
employed in applications for patent made under Section 41 (1) of the
PatentAct. That section provides as follows:
In the case of inventions relating to substances prepared or produced
by chemical processes and intended for food or medicine, the specification shall not include claims for the substance itself, except when prepared or produced by the methods or processes of manufacture particularly described and claimed or by their obvious chemical equivalents.
In other words, in patents of the type referred to there can only
appear what are known as process-dependent claims.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that an applicant for a patent
can not satisfy the requirements of Section 41(1) of the Patent Act
for a claim for a substance by the filing of a broad process claim
for the production of a whole genus of which a substance is one, if
the claim, because of its generality, is found to be invalid. The Court
pointed out that the subsection was intended to place a strict limitation upon claims for substances by chemical process and intended for
food or medicine. As provided in the subsection such a substance
can not be claimed by itself. It can only be claimed when produced
by a particular process of manufacture. The applicant for patent
must claim not only the substance but that process by which it is
manufactured. Therefore, in order to comply with the subsection he
must make two claims. He must make valid claims to both the process and the substance if he is to be entitled successfully to claim the
latter. The Court further held that to interpret the subsection as
meaning that all that is necessary is to file a claim for the process,
valid or not, would be to defeat its purpose.
It will thus be seen that when a substance prepared or produced
by a chemical process and intended for food or medicine is claimed,
it must be claimed by reference to a claim for the process by which
it is produced and that process claim must be valid. The applicant

